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ABSTRACT 
Modern SCADA systems are increasingly adopting Internet 
technologies to control distributed industrial assets. As proprietary 
communication protocols are increasingly being used over public 
networks without efficient protection mechanisms, it is 
increasingly easier for attackers to penetrate into the 
communication networks of companies that operate electrical 
power grids, water plants, and other critical infrastructure 
systems. To provide protection against such attacks without 
changing legacy configurations, SCADA systems require an 
intrusion detection technique that can understand information 
carried by network traffic based on proprietary SCADA protocols. 
To achieve that goal, we adapted Bro, a specification-based 
intrusion detection system, for SCADA protocols in our previous 
work [13]. In that work, we built into Bro a new parser to support 
DNP3, a complex proprietary network protocol that is widely 
used in SCADA systems for electrical power grids [4]. The built-
in parser provides clear visibility of network events related to 
SCADA systems. The semantics associated with the events 
provide us with a fine-grained operational context of the SCADA 
system, including types of operations and their parameters. Based 
on such information, we propose in this work two security 
policies to perform authentication and integrity checking on 
observed SCADA network traffic. To evaluate the proposed 
security policies, we simulated SCADA-specific attack scenarios 
in a test-bed, including real proprietary devices used in an 
electrical power grid. Experiments showed that the proposed 
intrusion detection system with the security policies can work 
efficiently in a large industry control environment that can include 
approximately 4000 devices.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [Security and Protection]  
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
SCADA, DNP3, Bro, specification-based intrusion detection 
system, authentication 
1. INTRODUCTION 
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems 
monitor and control geographically distributed assets found in 
power grids, water plants, and other critical infrastructures. 
Exposing such control systems to public networks increases the 
risk of attacks and failures inherited from the commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) network infrastructure. However, many companies 
operating critical infrastructures still use proprietary 
communication protocols that have been integrated directly into 
the TCP/IP stack without addition of appropriate protection 
mechanisms. Consequently, the cyber threat to SCADA 
operations is “one of the most serious economic and national 
security challenges we face” [17]. This threat no longer exists in 
theory only. For example, in 2011, an attacker penetrated the 
control system of a water plant in Texas [12]; in a similar incident 
in 2012, gas pipelines were attacked by cyber intruders [10].  
Some efforts to provide secure communications have been made, 
such as design of more secure protocols [5][16]. However, 
deployment of those approaches on existing legacy hardware and 
software cannot be accomplished overnight.  
To provide secure communications without changing the current 
communication structure in control environments, we propose use 
of a specification-based intrusion detection system (IDS) to 
extend proprietary protocols with security functionalities. 
Specifically, we adapted Bro [20][22], a real-time network traffic 
analyzer, to integrate parsers for proprietary network protocols, 
such as a DNP3 protocol used in the cyber infrastructures of the 
electrical power grid. The built-in parsers generate network events 
related to SCADA commands. In previous work, we described 
how the IDS extracts semantics from DNP3 network packets, so 
we could validate conformance of the communication pattern to 
the protocol definitions [13]. 
In this paper, we focus on details of how the SCADA semantics 
can be used to enhance proprietary SCADA protocols to provide 
secure communications. We propose the introduction of security 
policies into the IDS to provide the SCADA protocols with basic 
but also critical security functionalities: (1). verify that the 
observed operations are from the authenticated site; and (2) verify 
that the operation is free from corruption during communication. 
With the help of the parser, the proposed IDS can distinguish 
observed control operations based on their physical locations, 
access types, command parameters, and other attributes. Based on 
that information, we can adapt the policies to meet specific 
requirements in control environments. It is possible to implement 
and execute the policies in the isolated trusted IDS domain 
without changing current communication structures in the general 
industrial control environment.  
We evaluated the IDS and the implementation of the security 
policies in a test-bed that included real proprietary devices used in 
the electrical power grid. To simulate attack scenarios, we 
successfully built a piece of Trojan malware and included it in a 
legacy device. In the attack scenarios, the IDS performed 
intensive computation while monitoring and detecting malicious 
network traffic.  
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we analyze security threats and present our assumptions. Section 
3 presents the construction of the proposed IDS. Section 4 
describes in detail the security policies that will extend DNP3 
with authentication and integrity validation functionalities. 
Section 5 describes the experimental test-bed and the policy 
implementations. In Section 6, we evaluate the proposed IDS and 
the implemented security policies. An overview of related work is 
provided in Section 7. We conclude in the last section. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Threat Model 
Figure 1 presents components of SCADA systems commonly 
used in electrical power grids. Other industry control systems, 
such as gas and oil pipelines and wastewater control systems, 
share a similar communication structure [21]. 
Control Center. In the control center, human machine interface 
(HMI) computers are included to acquire measurement data from 
connected remote sites. After analyzing the data, human operators 
issue appropriate control operations. The collected data as well as 
issued operations are logged in a data historian. The control center 
can be penetrated through dial-in modems, wireless access points, 
and other pathways, as shown in [25]. That causes severe 
problems, as attackers can masquerade as insiders. By itself, the 
building of more secure communications, as discussed in this 
paper, is not sufficient to solve those problems. As a result, in this 
work, we assume that the control center is trusted. 
Field Devices. Located in the remote field site, the field devices 
(also referred to as Remote Terminal Units in some documents) 
act as a gateway that communicates with actuators and sensors. 
All field devices, actuators, and sensors tend to be connected in an 
Ethernet to avoid point-to-point connections. The field devices 
usually run COTS operating systems and can be configured 
remotely over communication networks. As a result, field devices 
can be compromised by malware to perform man-in-the-middle 
attacks. Notably, in this work, we inserted a piece of Trojan 
malware into a real proprietary field device. The malware can 
successfully perform false-data injection attacks by modifying 
measurement data in DNP3 network packets [15]. Similarly, 
errors can also be injected into DNP3 traffic issued to field sites. 
Control Network. This long-distance communication channel 
connects the control center and remote field sites. The question of 
whether or not the information transmitted over the control 
network is trusted depends on what protocols are used. In this 
paper, we focus on deploying protections over vulnerable SCADA 
protocols. Consequently, the SCADA network traffic cannot be 
trusted during the transmission, as an attacker can connect to the 
control network to sniff the SCADA traffic and replay it. 
However, with the same physical media, we could set up trusted 
tunnels between our instances of IDS sensors, as shown in the 
section 3.3.  
Actuators and Sensors. It is also possible to penetrate through 
actuators and sensors by generating false measurement data. 
Based on these data, the control center may estimate a faulty state 
of a field site and thus issue incorrect commands [15]. It is 
possible to physically protect enough actuators and sensors to 
prevent the generation of false data [2][11]. However, exploiting 
field devices to generate false data does not require physical 
access, and we believe that this is a more severe and realistic 
threat to the industry control environment.  
In this work, we focus on the transmission of DNP3 packets from 
the trusted control center to the actuators and sensors through the 
malicious communication media, including the untrusted control 
network and field devices.  
 
Figure 1: SCADA Systems Used in Electrical Power Grids 
2.2 DNP3: Distributed Network Protocol 
In this paper, we focus on extending the DNP3 protocol with 
security functionalities. Most previous research has focused on the 
Modbus protocol [23], which defines very simple structure for its 
network packets. The DNP3 protocol, however, is a 
“representative complex SCADA protocol” [7] packed into the 
TCP/IP stack in a complicated manner. Thus, it is difficult to 
manually extract information from DNP3 network packets. 
DNP3 was initially used over serial lines, so it defines its own 
application layer, transport layer, and data link layer. That 
hierarchy cannot be directly mapped to the TCP/IP stack. As a 
result, all three DNP3 layers are packed together as a single 
application layer payload over the TCP layer (Figure 2).  
The original application layer of the DNP3 protocol introduces 
complex structures as well. Each application layer fragment starts 
with an application header, which indicates what operations are 
performed. Multiple object headers can follow the application 
header to index target devices. Thus, it is possible to apply the 
same operation to multiple devices by issuing a single packet. The 
data object following the object header indicates the specific 
parameters of the operation. In this paper, we directly use DNP 
packets to refer to the original DNP3 application layer fragment.  
 
Figure 2: DNP3 over TCP 
3. DNP3 ANALYZER 
In this section, we present the main components of the DNP3 
analyzer, the proposed IDS based on Bro [20][22]. Bro is a real-
time network traffic analyzer widely used in forensic analysis, 
intrusion detection, and other network-related analysis. The 
modifications that we made to adapt Bro for SCADA 
environments are highlighted in Figure 3. 
3.1 DNP3 Parser 
We built a new parser for the DNP3 protocol. The main 
responsibility of the parser is to decode byte streams into 
meaningful data fields according to the protocol definition. After 
parsing, the DNP3 parser generates SCADA system-specific 
events.  
 
 
Figure 3: DNP3 Analyzer Based on Bro 
The DNP3 parser exploits a compiler-assisted tool named binpac 
to shorten the development period and to ensure logical 
correctness [19]. At the current stage, we built and included in 
Bro the DNP3 parser to support complex hierarchical structure 
found in the DNP3 protocol. By using the same binpac technique, 
we believe that parsers to support other SCADA protocols can 
similarly be developed.  
3.2 Event Handlers 
Event handlers are used to analyze network events generated from 
the parsing of each DNP3 network packet. The semantic 
information related to each event is extracted during parsing. For 
example, a dnp3_crob (Control Relay Output Block) event is 
generated by the DNP3 parser if an operation to control relay 
outputs is found within a DNP3 request. The parameters 
associated with this operation, such as the type and duration of the 
operation, are extracted from the packet and delivered to the 
corresponding event handler. 
A declaration of an event handler, including its name and 
arguments, provides an interface between the DNP3 parser and 
the policy script interpreter. During the parsing at run-time, the 
value of each argument is updated by the semantic information 
related to the event. We declared and associated an event handler 
with each type of data field defined in the DNP3 protocol; thus, 
the DNP3 analyzer can cover all semantic information from any 
type of DNP3 network packet. Although the declarations of event 
handlers are fixed, their definitions (what one does with an event) 
are left to be implemented in Bro scripts written by security 
experts. In specific operational contexts, such as operations in 
power grids, one can dynamically adjust security policies by 
including definitions of different event handlers. 
3.3 DNP3 Analyzer Deployment 
The proposed DNP3 analyzer can be connected to a network 
switch or a router in both the control center and the field sites 
(Figure 4). Most commercial switches or routers provide “span 
ports” or “mirror ports” that replicate all network traffic going 
through them. Being tapped to those ports, DNP3 analyzers are 
able to monitor and analyze local network events within the 
control center or the field sites as well as global communications 
between them. Furthermore, a DNP3 analyzer instance, deployed 
in a separate off-the-shelf workstation, is able to build a trusted 
communication channel, e.g. over TLS/SSL, to other DNP3 
analyzer instances.  
 
Figure 4: DNP3 Analyzer Deployment 
4. SECURITY POLICIES 
In our previous work, we developed a protocol validation policy 
to verify whether observed DNP3 network packets conform to 
protocol definitions [13]. In this paper, we focus in detail on how 
to use the extracted semantics to protect against malicious attacks. 
The original DNP3 protocol does not include effective 
authentication and encryption mechanisms1. In this section, we 
propose two security policies for detecting attacks that exploit 
those vulnerabilities. The proposed policies are specifically 
defined for the context of SCADA systems that operate electrical 
power grids. 
The DNP3 analyzer inherits Bro’s core idea of separating event 
generation from event analysis. Consequently, security policies 
presented in this section can be adjusted at run-time to meet 
specific operational context and attack scenarios.  
4.1 Authentication Policy 
4.1.1 Attack scenario 
With a vulnerable network configuration, it is possible for an 
attacker to connect to the control network through bring-your-
own-device (BYOD) mechanism. Thus, the attacker can sniff and 
modify DNP3 network packets to perform replay attacks. By 
issuing control operations, he or she can maliciously control the 
remote field sites.  
4.1.2 Policy specifications 
In the initial approach, we proposed to rely on host system 
activities in the control center to perform authentications. 
Specifically, system logs or application logs that contain the 
relevant information, such as who issued what operations at what 
time, are correlated to the run-time network packets observed by 
the DNP3 analyzer.  
This technique, which feeds host semantics back to the network 
IDS, has been used in general computing environments [6]. 
However, we found that it must be adapted to meet specific 
requirements in the control environment. In the industry control 
environment, network traffic can be divided into two types:  
• Automatic operations. Controlled by hardwired machines, 
these operations are frequently issued to retrieve 
measurement values from remote sites, e.g., DNP3 
operations that read binary outputs. 
• Manual operations. Controlled by human operators, these 
operations are used to configure field devices or operate 
actuators and sensors, e.g., DNP3 operations that edit a 
configuration file or open/close a replay. 
Based on that classification, an authentication policy includes two 
rules:  
 
1
 DNP3 provides only authentication, based on a plain-text 
password, for opening or deleting files in remote devices. 
(1) A host activity (in terms of system logs or application logs) 
must be found to match each manual DNP3 operation 
observed in the network. 
(2) It is recommended, but not required, that automatic DNP3 
operations be authenticated.  
With the help of the DNP3 parser, we can divide the observed 
DNP3 network packets into those two categories. Consequently, 
the DNP3 analyzer can selectively authenticate the manual 
operations. 
4.2 Integrity Policy 
4.2.1 Attack scenario 
If an attacker penetrates into field devices, he or she may use the 
mediator that connects the control center and the field site (as 
shown in Figure 1) to perform a man-in-the-middle attack. For 
example, the attacker can corrupt the measurement data sent to the 
control center and also change the operations issued to remote 
field sites. In this scenario, we assume that the field devices, 
actuator, and sensors are connected through network switches or 
routers.  
4.2.2 Policy specifications 
The integrity policy provides site-awareness detections on 
corrupted network packets. A single DNP3 packet can be related 
to multiple physical devices, which are indexed by the object 
headers (Figure 2). As a result, when a DNP3 packet passes a 
field device, the packet is usually divided into several packets 
issued to different physical devices. The original network header 
may be replaced with the new ones, but the payload of each DNP3 
packet, such as issued operations or the measurement data, should 
not be changed.  
Based on that understanding, the following integrity policy is 
defined and validated against each field device:  
(1) Payload values contained in the ingress and egress DNP3 
packets of the same field device must not be modified. 
The comparison requires only logic operations, so detection and 
location of the corrupted field device can be done very efficiently. 
With the help of the DNP3 parser, we can also easily locate which 
values are corrupted in order to better understand the attacker’s 
intentions. For example, if we can inform the control center that 
an attacker has changed a DNP3 request that was supposed to 
open a relay into the one that closes it, the system operator will 
have more information to use in performing remedial activities.  
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Experimental Environment 
We implemented the proposed security policies, i.e., the 
authentication policy and the integrity policy, in an experimental 
test-bed with real-world hardware devices and software to mimic 
realistic configuration and operation of power grid substations, as 
shown in Figure 52. Furthermore, we added various different 
components to the test-bed to simulate the attack scenarios 
mentioned in Section 4.  
 
2
 The name and the model of the hardware devices are hidden to 
preserve the manufacturers’ privacy 
 
Figure 5: SCADA Test-bed 
The test-bed included the following basic components:   
HMI. This workstation can run COTS systems, such as Windows 
XP or Ubuntu, to simulate the control center. In the HMI, we ran 
Protocol Test Harness, software from Triangle MicroWork Inc. 
[24], to control simulated field sites though DNP3 network 
packets.   
Relay. The protection replay was connected to a Relay Test 
System and periodically monitored its health status. 
The Relay Test System. This proprietary hardware device 
simulated the configurations of power systems. For example, the 
IEEE 14-bus system or IEEE 30-bus system can be configured 
and run in the relay test system. 
Data Aggregator. The data aggregator included a DNP3 agent 
that forwarded an operation from the control center to the relay 
and aggregated measurement data from it. The data aggregator ran 
a custom Ubuntu operating system on the PowerPC architecture. 
Monitor Machine. The monitor machine was a separate COTS 
workstation in which the proposed DNP3 analyzer ran 
independently without affecting the operations of the simulated 
control center and field site. All the components were connected 
to a network switch. The switch was configured such that all 
network traffic was “mirrored” to the monitor machine.  
The test-bed included the following attack-scenario-specific 
components:  
Replaying Agent. This module was written in C and relied on the 
TCP/IP socket API. It sniffed the DNP3 network packets on the 
network and replayed them with errors injected into random 
locations. Corresponding error detection codes (CRC values) were 
recalculated to simulate malicious modifications.  
Trojan DNP3 Agent. Similar to the replaying agent, this malware 
was written in C and relied on the TCP/IP socket API. In addition 
to performing the same packet forwarding done by the original 
DNP3 agent, it modified the forwarded DNP3 packets at random 
locations with random values. Corresponding error detection 
codes (CRC values) were recalculated to simulate malicious 
modifications. The module was cross-compiled and installed in 
the proprietary data aggregator, and the error-injected packets 
were successfully processed without generating any errors.  
5.2 Authentication Policy Implementation 
In general enterprise systems, an SSH client or FTP client usually 
delivers application logs to operating systems. In a real power grid 
control center, the data historian plays a similar role by logging 
local activities, such as what operations are issued. In the HMI 
included in the test-bed, we logged operations issued by the 
Protocol Test Harness and delivered the logs to the monitor 
machine. We implemented that approach by configuring a remote 
syslog server in the monitor machine. The syslog messages were 
transmitted over encrypted tunnels, so they could not be replayed. 
We believe that this implementation is also possible in a real 
power grid environment.  
Table 1: Pseudo Code of the Authentication Policy 
event syslog_message(facility: count, userID: count, UsrID: 
count, logFc: count, obj_type: count, ……){ 
if(facility >= 16 && facility <= 18){ 
          globalUsrID = UsrID; 
          globalFc = logFc; 
          globalObj = obj_type; 
……. 
} 
} 
event dnp3_obj_header(c: connection, is_orig: bool, app_control: 
count, fc : count, obj_type : count, ….){ 
if( globalSyslog – current_time() < INTERVAL  
     && globalFc == fc && globalObj == obj_type  
     && …….){ 
          MATCH; 
} 
else{   ALERT;  } 
} 
 
Table 1 shows pseudo-code of the authentication policy written by 
Bro scripts. In the implementation, we defined the 
syslog_message event handler that was already declared by Bro’s 
syslog analyzer. The event handler records in global variables the 
attributes of an operation logged by the HMI, such as timestamp, 
operator ID, and operation type and parameters. The definitions of 
three event handlers, i.e., dnp3_request_header, 
dnp3_response_header, and dnp3_object, extract values of the 
function code, the object type, and other semantic information 
from the observed DNP3 network packet. The DNP3 analyzer 
relies on the information recorded by the syslog_message event 
handler within a predefined time interval to verify whether the 
network packet was issued from the control center.  
Even though the control center can issue operations in parallel, the 
legacy devices, such as the relay machine, can only handle 
operations in serial, for compatibility reasons. Consequently, for 
each hardware device that can be identified by IP addresses, we 
matched a single DNP3 packet with a single syslog message. If an 
attacker injects different SCADA operations through the replaying 
agent, this activity can always be detected.  
5.3 Integrity Policies Implementation 
As SCADA systems tend to rely on Internet technology for 
communication, field devices can be identified through IP 
addresses. In our test-bed configuration, the HMI, the data 
aggregator, and the relay machine were assigned different IP 
addresses.  
Table 2: Pseudo Code of the Integrity Policy 
…… 
event dnp3_analog_input_32(c: connection, value: count) { 
      if ( c $ id $ orig_h == Relay_IP  
                &&  c $ id $ dest_h == Data_Aggregator_IP ){ 
              globalValue = value; 
      } 
      If (c $ id $ orig_h == Data_Aggregator_IP 
               && c $ id $ dest_h == Control_Center _IP){ 
              If (gloabValue != value)  ALERT;  
      } 
} 
…… 
 
The implementation included the definitions of four groups of 
event handlers: dnp3_analog_input_xx, dnp3_analog_output_xx, 
dnp3_binary_input_xx, and dnp3_binary_output_xx (“xx” denotes 
data formats, e.g., 8-bit, 16-bit, etc.). Because of space limitations, 
we present only the implementation on a dnp3_analog_input_32 
event handler (see Table 2). This event handler is executed 
whenever a 32-bit analog input value is found in a DNP3 
response.  
Based on the source and destination IP addresses, the DNP3 
analyzer distinguishes between network packets with different 
directions. If a packet is an ingress packet delivered from the relay 
(represented by the first “if” statement), we store this value in a 
global variable. When an egress packet is observed from the data 
aggregator to the control center (represented by the second “if” 
statement), a comparison is made to determine whether or not the 
measurement was corrupted during processing. 
6. DNP3 ANALYZER EVALUATION 
6.1 Evaluation Traces 
In order to intensify the computations of the authentication policy, 
we used the replaying agent to randomly inject DNP3 operations 
among legal DNP3 operations issued and logged by the HMI. 
Based on the logs from the HMI, we could also verify whether or 
not the proposed DNP3 analyzer generated correct alerts.  
Similarly, we replaced the original DNP3 agent in the data 
aggregator with the Trojan DNP3 agent. The Trojan DNP3 agent 
injected errors into the measurement data carried by responses to 
the HMI. Injection of errors into the control operations carried by 
requests can be performed similarly. However, as we randomly 
injected errors, we observed that corrupted requests triggered 
warnings from the relay machine and made it respond 
inappropriately. Therefore, in the experiment, we injected errors 
only into the measurement data, to perform stealthy attacks. The 
Trojan DNP3 agent was further instrumented to log all the 
injected errors, to help us determine whether the DNP3 analyzer 
made the right detections.  
In both attack scenarios, we planned to further reduce the latency 
between issued operations, to analyze the processing capabilities 
of the DNP3 analyzer. However, if the interval between DNP3 
operations is less than or equal to 0.5 seconds, the data aggregator 
and the relay will miss network packets from time to time. In the 
real power grid environment, DNP3 packets are usually issued at 
a frequency of one or two packets per second [9]. Consequently, 
instead of evaluating the DNP3 analyzer online, we collected 
network traces in two attack scenarios and evaluated the DNP3 
analyzer offline.  
We refer to the two network traces as the A-trace (extracted from 
the attack scenario evaluating the authentication policy) and the I-
trace (extracted from the attack scenario evaluating the integrity 
policy). Detailed descriptions of both traces are presented in Table 
3.  
Table 3: DNP3 Network Traces 
Trace Description Size (MB) 
Size 
(DNP3 packets) 
A-trace 
Contained both syslog 
messages and DNP3 
network packets.  
1100 2,200,100 
I-trace 
Contained DNP3 packets 
carrying measurement 
data 
995 2,040,000 
 
6.2 Performance Overhead 
As the DNP3 analyzer is used to analyze industry control 
environments passively, it must process network packets in real 
time to provide useful detection results. In this section, we 
evaluate the throughput of the DNP3 analyzer. We adopt two 
throughput metrics for evaluation: the number of bits processed 
per second (bps), and the number of packets processed per second 
(pps). Performance overheads generated by the DNP3 parsers and 
the policies are analyzed separately. 
The DNP3 analyzer processed all packet traces, i.e., both the A-
trace and I-trace, off-line on the monitor machine. At run-time, 
the DNP3 analyzer ran independently without affecting operations 
of the simulated SCADA components. The purpose of the 
additional off-line analysis performed in this section was to 
evaluate analyzers’ ultimate processing capabilities on DNP3 
network packets. The resulting analysis can give us an idea of 
how the proposed DNP3 analyzer fits the real SCADA systems in 
addition to the simulated test-bed.  
The monitor machine was a VMware virtual machine with a 
single logical processor of two 3.07GHz cores and a 1GB RAM. 
During the processing, the monitor VM ran exclusively on the 
host machine in order to avoid interference from other virtual 
machines.  
6.2.1 Performance overhead by the parser 
The DNP3 parser (the DNP3 analyzer without any policy loaded) 
will always be used to parse DNP3 network packets. As a result, it 
should be efficiently implemented. To demonstrate its efficiency, 
we compared it to the FTP parser (parsing FTP control commands 
only) that was already integrated in Bro. The reason we chose the 
FTP parser was that application layer functionality and payload 
size of FTP network packets are similar to those of the DNP3 
packets.  
For the work described in this paper, we used FTP traces from 
[18] as the workload of the FTP parser. However, the traces could 
not be directly used in this experiment, as all FTP 
requests/responses were included in a single TCP session. In the 
collected DNP3 packets, however, each pair of DNP3 
requests/responses were included in an individual TCP session. 
To solve that problem, we extracted the application payload from 
the FTP traces. Then we replayed over contained internal 
networks each pair of FTP request and response in separate TCP 
sessions. The replay resulted in a traffic trace with a large size. 
We collected 989M of the resulting trace, which included 
2,392,000 FTP packets.  
We ran Bro’s FTP analyzer against that FTP trace and the DNP3 
analyzer against the A-trace (with all syslog messages removed). 
We did not load any policies for either analyzer. As a result, only 
the parser processed the corresponding network trace. We 
performed each experiment for 10 runs to measure the average 
execution time. 
The evaluation results are presented in Table 4. Even though a 
DNP3 packet can have complex structures, the DNP3 parser had a 
better throughput (about 40% better) than the FTP parser in terms 
of both evaluation metrics. The reason was probably due to the 
fact that the DNP3 parser was implemented by the binpac scripts. 
The binpac scripts were automatically optimized and translated 
into the resulting C++ codes. The FTP parser, however, was 
directly written in C++ in Bro with few manual optimizations. As 
most of Bro’s prebuilt parsers, including the FTP parser, have 
been evaluated in an intense computing environment, we can 
expect that the DNP3 parser will have a similar performance in a 
large-scale industry environment. 
Table 4: Comparison of the DNP3 Parser and the FTP Parser 
Evaluation Target Throughput (Mbps) 
Throughput 
(pps) 
DNP3 Parser 35.34 7123.5 
FTP Parser 23.56 13950.4 
 
6.2.2 Performance overhead by the policies 
To evaluate the additional performance overhead generated by 
policies, we loaded the DNP3 parser with two policies and ran the 
analyzer against the corresponding traces. We performed each 
experiment for 10 runs to measure the average execution time. 
The evaluation results in terms of two throughput metrics are 
presented in the two sub-figures of Figure 6. Since we evaluated 
each policy on two different network traffic traces, i.e., the A-
trace and I-trace (see Table 3), we separated the results into two 
separate groups. In each group, we used “DNP3 Parser” to 
represent the scenario in which the DNP3 analyzer processed the 
network trace without any policy loaded. In other words, only the 
DNP3 parser was working. In the other scenario, represented by 
“DNP3 Parser + Policy,” both the DNP3 parser and the policy 
script interpreter worked to process the network trace.  
The throughput degradation (in both metrics) ranged from 9% to 
15%. Notably, the implementations of the security policies were 
not optimized; for example, redundant alerts were not removed. 
During the processing of both the A-trace and I-trace, the DNP3 
analyzer performed intense analysis and I/O operations (writing 
alerts to local files).  
 
(a) 
 (b) 
Figure 6: The Throughput of the DNP3 Analyzer with 
Policies: (a) in Mbps; (b) in pps  
Even under those conditions, more than 8000 DNP3 network 
packets were processed every second (when the I-trace was 
processed). In an industrial control environment such as the power 
grid, legacy devices usually issue one or two DNP3 network 
packets every second [9]. Based on those figures, we anticipate 
that the proposed DNP3 analyzer can monitor a field site 
consisting of 4000 to 8000 devices. When more DNP3 analyzers 
are distributed into different host machines to form a monitor 
cluster, a larger-scale control environment can be monitored.  
7. RELATED WORK 
Traditional signature-based intrusion detection techniques are not 
widely used in control environments, because little analysis of 
real attacks is publicly available. Instead, anomaly-based intrusion 
detection techniques were initially used in the area. These 
techniques detect intrusions based on deviation from profiled 
baseline behavior. In [14][26], normal network communication 
patterns are formed based on destination host addresses, port 
numbers, and other information extracted from the network packet 
header through profiling or self-adaptive learning. Suspicious 
events caused by attackers, such as a random scan in field sites, 
usually generate network behavior that deviates from normal 
patterns and thus can be detected. However, anomaly-based 
detection techniques fail to detect malicious network packets 
following normal communication patterns, as in the attack 
scenarios discussed in this paper. 
Specification-based techniques rely on a specific model or policy 
that is constructed based on the internal logic of the monitored 
system. At run-time, any system behavior that deviates from this 
policy or model triggers alerts. The work in [3] assumes that the 
attackers’ activities usually result in malformed network packets. 
A policy is defined to verify whether the structure of each 
network packet conforms to the definitions of the Modbus 
protocol, another proprietary protocol used in SCADA systems 
[23]. Compared to Modbus, many other proprietary protocols, 
such as DNP3, are much more complex and contain more diverse 
semantics. Without fully understanding the SCADA-specific 
semantics, it is hard to design security policies to analyze well-
formatted network traffic with malicious intentions. Work 
presented in [1] applies a specification-based technique to the 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), which is a very different 
wireless communication environment. [1] emphasizes the design 
of system models or specifications and their formal verification. 
The difference between [1] and our work is that we focus on the 
design of a SCADA-specific IDS that can be used in real SCADA 
systems to provide various run-time semantic analyses, such as 
extension of proprietary protocols with the security functionalities 
proposed in this paper. 
The research described in [8] performed forensic analysis of 
semantic information collected from real critical infrastructure. 
The method used in the paper is similar to the specification-based 
detection techniques. Our work is different in that we propose an 
online IDS that can fit into a real SCADA operational 
environment. In SCADA systems, the latency of intrusion 
detection and response should be small so system operators can 
perform necessary remedial processes instantly. Thus, the 
proposed DNP3 analyzer was evaluated for its ultimate processing 
capabilities.  
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose a DNP3 analyzer, an IDS that performs 
in-depth analysis on semantics from network traffic in control 
environments. With the help of our built-in DNP3 parser, the 
analyzer is able to generate real-time events related to SCADA 
systems. A sufficient number of event handlers are declared and 
associated with packet data fields to cover all semantic 
information carried by DNP3 network traffic. 
We further propose two security policies to extend the DNP3 
protocol with capabilities to authenticate and validate the integrity 
of each network packet. Knowledge of the SCADA system’s 
operational context, such as the type of operations and their 
parameters, enables efficient and accurate policy design and 
implementation. To evaluate the proposed security policies, we 
simulated SCADA-specific attack scenarios in a test-bed that 
included real proprietary devices. The attack scenarios forced the 
DNP3 analyzer perform intensive computation to monitor and 
detect malicious activities. Based on the experimental results, the 
proposed DNP3 analyzer presented good processing capabilities, 
which shows a potential to work in a large-scale environment.  
In future work, we plan to correlate SCADA-specifics semantics 
observed from the network with domain-specific security 
analysis, such as contingency analysis, in the power grid 
environment. As a result, the proposed DNP3 analyzer can better 
understand the effect of the semantics observed from the network 
traffic. Based on this analysis, the DNP3 analyzer can detect 
DNP3 network packets with legal communication patterns but 
carrying malicious control operations in payload.  
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